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ABSTRACT 
Is the Event Study Methodology Useful for Merger Analysis?     
A Comparison of Stock Market and Accounting Data*
by Tomaso Duso, Klaus Gugler, and Burçin Yurtoglu 
We use a sample of 167 mergers during the period 1990-2002 involving 544 
firms either as merging firms or competitors.  We contrast a measure of the 
merger’s profitability based on event studies with one based on accounting 
data.  We find positive and significant correlations between them when using a 
long window around the announcement date. 
 
 
Keywords:  Mergers, Merger Control, Event Studies, Ex-post Evaluation 
JEL Classification:  L4, K21, G34 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Ist die "event study" Methodologie nützlich für die Analyse von Fusionen? 
Ein Vergleich von Aktienmärkte und Bilanzdaten 
Wir analysieren eine Stichprobe von 167 Fusionen, die zwischen 1990 und 
2002 stattgefunden haben und welche 544 Unternehmen –entweder als 
fusionierende Parteien oder als Wettbewerber– involviert haben.  Wir 
vergleichen eine auf "event studies" basierende Rentabilitätsmaß der Fusion zu 
einer alternativen Maß, die durch Bilanzdaten konstruiert wurde.  Wir finden, 
dass diese zwei maße positiv und signifikant korrelieren besonders wenn wir ein 
langes Fenster um die Fusionsankündigung in dem "event study" benutzen. 
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1. Introduction 
The assessment of the competitive effects of large mergers is one of the most important tasks for anti-
trust authorities worldwide. Unfortunately, these effects are not observed at the time when the 
authority must make its decision to allow or block the merger or let the merger through with remedies. 
In principle, stock markets could help predicting the future profitability, since they are forward 
looking. However, many economists, in particular industrial organization economists, are skeptical 
about the markets’ ability to correctly anticipate mergers’ competitive effects. Thus, the pioneering 
efforts of Eckbo (1983) have not been widely applied in merger analysis.  
This paper tries to close the gap between the finance and industrial organization literatures by  
estimating (1) (ex ante) announcement effects of mergers on both merging and rival firms, (2) (ex 
post) balance sheet profit effects of these mergers on merging and rival firms up to five years post-
mergers, and (3) comparing these estimates by correlation analysis.  
 
2. Measuring Profitability 
2.1. Event Studies 
Under the assumptions of efficient markets and rational expectations, the market model predicts that 
firm  i’s stock return at time t ( it R ) is proportional to a market return ( it mt it R R ε β α + + = ). We 
estimate the market model over 240 trading days, starting 50 days prior to the announcement day. We 
use the estimated values for the model’s parameters to predict what firm i’s stock price would have 
been, had the merger not been announced ( it R ˆ ). For firm i, we then calculate the abnormal return 
around the mergers’ announcement day t ( ARi,t) as:  ) ˆ ˆ ( ˆ
mt it it it it R R R R AR β α + − = − = . The 











= ∑ . We calculate these measures for each of the merging rival firms.
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2.2. Ex-post Profitability 
We use the methodology of Gugler et al. (2003) to predict the merger’s ex post profit effects. The 
method compares reported profit levels post merger with predicted profit levels in the absence of the 
merger. Our counterfactual is the development of profits and total assets of the median firm (in terms 
of profitability) in the same 3-digit industry as the merging firms or their rivals operate. We used a 
number of other counterfactuals, such as similar size or geographical regions but none changed our 
results significantly. 
                                                 
1 See Duso, Gugler, and Yurtoglu (2006) for a description of the literature, the data, and a more complete description of the 
methodology.     2
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, where ΠIGt+n are the median firm’s (income statement) profits and KIDt+n 
are the median firm’s assets both in the same 3-digit industry of the acquired company in year t+n. 
We define ∆ID t,t+n for the acquired firm’s industry analogously to ∆IG t-1,t+n. The predicted profits of 
the combined company M in year t+n is then:
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where ΠGt+n (ΠDt) are the profits and KGt+n (KDt) are the assets of the acquiring (acquired) company in 
year t+n (t).  
The same logic can be applied to the rivals. In fact, antitrust markets are different than 
industries based on the SIC classification. The advantage of our database is that we have information 
on the merging firms’ effective rivals in the involved product markets. These firms are not a good 
counterfactual, since they are influenced by the merger just as much as the merging firms are. 
However, the merger should not strongly affect the rest of the industry, which makes the 3-digit SIC 
classification a good counterfactual for the merger, once we exclude the merging and rivals firms. We 
can, hence, get a measure of the projected change in the returns and of the predicted profit for the 
rivals in absence of the merger, which is something novel in the literature.  
Our measure of firm i's merger effect (i=merging entity or rivals) is then the difference 






n it + + + ∆Π − ∆Π = ∆Π  
 
3. The Data and Correlations 
Our sample consists of 167 concentrations that were analyzed by the European Commission (EC) 
during the period 1990-2002.
2 We identify 544 different firms either as merging or as rival firms.
 The 
relevant markets and, thus, rivals are defined in the EC reports. 
  Table 1 reports the median values for the CARs based on different event windows and the 
profitability effects ( ,
effect
it n + ∆Π ) for merging firms and rivals up to five years after the merger. In the 
full sample, all median values (with the possible exception for CAR (2,2) for rivals, which is close to 
zero) have the same sign.   
  Table 2 reports pairwise correlations among CARs and profitability effects. For merging 
firms, the correlation coefficients between CAR (50, 5) and firms’ profit are always positive and 
mostly significant. The profit effects four years after the merger seem to be very well captured by all 
                                                 
2 Our sample includes almost all phase II mergers completed by the EU by the end of 2001, and a randomly matched 
sample of phase I cases, which run up to June 2002. See Duso, Neven, and Röller (2006).   3
measures of abnormal returns. However, CARs based on long windows seem to perform better. The 
picture is different for rivals: CARs based on short windows produce very misleading results, since 
they are negatively and significantly correlated to the real profit effects. However, for rivals the CARs 
based on long windows (30 or 55 days) also seem to capture very well the long term merger’s profit 
effects. 
  Table 3 splits the sample into pro and anticompetitive mergers.
3 Interestingly, the market 
correctly anticipates anti-competitive mergers when using long pre-announcement periods (25 to 50 
days), as witnessed by the large and significant correlation coefficients for rivals up to five years post 
merger. Also, the market predicts merging firms’ rents stemming from increased efficiencies 
(procompetitive mergers) more precisely than those stemming from an increase in market power 
(anticompetitive mergers). 
 
4. Conclusions  
This paper establishes empirical evidence that the event study methodology is useful for the 
competitive analysis of mergers. In particular, for a large sample of EU mergers during the period 
1990-2002, we show that abnormal returns and ex post profitability of mergers are positively and 
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Table 1: Preliminary Statistics 
 
 MERGING  FIRMS 
  CAR(2,2) CAR(25,5)  CAR(50,5) ,1
effect
M t+ ∆Π ,2
effect
M t+ ∆Π ,3
effect
M t+ ∆Π   ,4
effect
M t+ ∆Π   ,5
effect
M t+ ∆Π  
Median  9.229 2.359  29.742  62.260  103.521  108.986  203.217  202.620 
Obs.  125 126 127 131  132  101 86  66 
 RIVALS 
  CAR(2,2) CAR(25,5)  CAR(50,5) ,
effect
it n + ∆Π   ,
effect
it n + ∆Π   ,
effect
it n + ∆Π   ,
effect
it n + ∆Π   ,
effect
it n + ∆Π  
Median  -0.571 5.666 4.528  69.256  53.328  74.230  103.467 242.653 
Obs.  314  313 311 321 327 221 174  143 
Notes: All values are expressed in Million US$. The CAR(m,n) variables represent the cumulative abnormal returns over the 
window spanning from m days before the event to n days after the event. The 
,
effect
it n + ∆Π  variables represent the aggregated profit 
change from one year before the merger to n years after the merger if compared to the median firm in the same SIC3 industry.  
  
Table 2: Pairwise Correlations: all mergers 
 MERGING  FIRMS  RIVALS 
 
CAR(1,1)  CAR(2,2) CAR(5,5) CAR(25,5) CAR(50,5) CAR(1,1)  CAR(2,2) CAR(5,5) CAR(25,5) CAR(50,5)
,1
effect
it + ∆Π   -0.1069 0.0144 -0.0357    0.1274 0.1643 -0.1752 0.0953  -0.0662 0.0690  0.1648 
   0.1870  0.8598   0.6599   0.1131  0.0411**   0.0005*** 0.0571**  0.1878 0.1703 0.0010***
,2
effect
it + ∆Π   -0.0314 0.1281 -0.0537    0.1289 0.2031 -0.2045 -0.1488  -0.0752 -0.0133 0.0611 
   0.7284  0.1546   0.5519   0.1488  0.0225**   0.0003*** 0.0082***  0.1855 0.8150 0.2814 
,3
effect
it + ∆Π   -0.0196  0.0013   0.0210   0.2022  0.2096 -0.2487 0.0024 -0.0983  0.0856 0.0617 
   0.8479  0.9900   0.8375   0.0448  0.0373**   0.0002*** 0.9715 0.1462 0.2057 0.3647 
,4
effect
it + ∆Π    0.3443  0.5408   0.0966   0.1601  0.4778 -0.1521 -0.1556  -0.0462  0.1802  0.0818 
   0.0013***  0.0000***   0.3848   0.1459  0.0000***  0.0464**  0.0415**  0.5474  0.0180**  0.2862 
,5
effect
it + ∆Π    0.1947  0.2882   0.1894   0.1444  0.0926  -0.2539 -0.1770  0.0615  0.4556 0.1837 
   0.1201  0.0199**   0.1309   0.2511  0.4630   0.0025*** 0.0364**  0.4704  0.0000*** 0.0298** 
Notes: We report pairwise correlation coefficients (first row) as well as p-values (second row).***, **, * represent 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.   5 




































Notes: We report pairwise correlation coefficients (first row) as well as p-values (second row).***, **, * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level respectively. A merger is defined to be anticompetitive (procompetitive) if the aggregated cumulative abnormal returns of the 
rivals - CAR(25,5) - are positive (negative). The sample includes all observations for which the variable  ,2
effect
it + ∆Π was not missing. 
  MERGING FIRMS 
  PROCOMPETITIVE  ANTICOMPETITIVE 
  CAR(1,1)  CAR(2,2)  CAR(5,5) CAR(25,5) CAR(50,5) CAR(1,1)  CAR(2,2)  CAR(5,5) CAR(25,5)  CAR(50,5) 
-0.1711   0.0434   0.0355   0.1252   0.1732   0.0494  -0.0254  -0.1132   0.1601   0.1697 
,1
effect
it + ∆Π    0.1451   0.7135   0.7639   0.2810   0.1401   0.6638   0.8243   0.3175   0.1560   0.1299 
 0.0608   0.2716   0.0655   0.1669   0.3442  -0.1242   0.0042  -0.1626   0.1104   0.1115 
,2
effect
it + ∆Π    0.6304   0.0286**   0.6040   0.1771   0.0050   0.3446   0.9748   0.2145   0.4012   0.3925 
-0.0845  -0.0331  -0.0486   0.2177   0.1635   0.1158   0.0688   0.1085   0.1993   0.2492 
,3
effect
it + ∆Π    0.5556   0.8175   0.7350   0.1211   0.2517   0.4384   0.6461   0.4679   0.1793   0.0877* 
 0.5701   0.8112   0.2547   0.2667   0.8304  -0.2472  -0.0637  -0.0456   0.0777   0.0818 
,4
effect
it + ∆Π    0.0000***   0.0000***   0.0840*   0.0669*   0.0000***   0.1461   0.7123   0.7918   0.6526   0.6304 
 0.3888   0.3361   0.2278  -0.0360  -0.0512  -0.2676   0.2903   0.1427   0.2360   0.1708 
,5
effect
it + ∆Π    0.0210**   0.0484**   0.1882   0.8374   0.7702   0.1527   0.1197   0.4518   0.2094   0.3668 
  RIVALS 
  PROCOMPETITIVE  ANTICOMPETITIVE 
  CAR(1,1)  CAR(2,2)  CAR(5,5)  CAR(25,5) CAR(50,5) CAR(1,1)  CAR(2,2)  CAR(5,5)  CAR(25,5) CAR(50,5) 
-0.2169   0.3314   0.0204   0.0085   0.1264  -0.1414  -0.1174  -0.1455   0.1444   0.2191 
,1
effect
it + ∆Π    0.0032***   0.0000***  0.7842   0.9090   0.0899   0.0392   0.0860*   0.0334**   0.0348**   0.0013*** 
-0.1605  -0.1222   0.0271  -0.2188  -0.0413  -0.3162  -0.2211  -0.2676   0.3003   0.2045 
,2
effect
it + ∆Π    0.0447**   0.1262   0.7365   0.0059***   0.6077   0.0001***   0.0055***   0.0008***   0.0002***   0.0104*** 
-0.2773   0.1216  -0.1338   0.0062   0.0402  -0.2000  -0.1353   0.0004   0.2199   0.1600 
,3
effect
it + ∆Π    0.0027***   0.1953   0.1541   0.9478   0.6724   0.0408   0.1687   0.9971   0.0242**   0.1029 
-0.2204 -0.2841  -0.2379  -0.0742 -0.0837 -0.1369  -0.0598    0.1817  0.4032   0.1853 
,4
effect
it + ∆Π    0.0328**   0.0055*   0.0210**   0.4770   0.4227   0.2318   0.6029   0.1113   0.0003***   0.1043 
 0.1696  -0.0355   0.3037   0.1482  -0.0266  -0.5945  -0.4058  -0.3331   0.6128   0.2933 
,5
effect
it + ∆Π    0.1514   0.7656   0.0090***   0.2108   0.8234   0.0000***   0.0007***   0.0059***   0.0000***   0.0160** Bücher des Schwerpunkts Märkte und Politik   
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